If knowledge is situated, and scientific knowledge is the product of rational consensus among diverse constituents, then a social organization that unifies many different social units functionally will have a ‘scientific’ ideology or rationale that is specific to the situation of that organization.
In other words, the political ideology of a group of people will be part of the glue that constitutes the group. Social beliefs will be a component of the collective identity.
A social science may be the elaboration of one such ideology. Many have been. So social scientific beliefs are about capturing the conditions for the social organization which maintains that belief. (c.f. Nietzsche on tablets of values)
There are good reasons to teach these specialized social sciences as a part of vocational training for certain functions. For example, people who work in finance or business can benefit from learning economics.
Only in an academic context does the professional identity of disciplinary affiliation matter. This academic political context creates great division and confusion that merely reflects the disorganization of the academic system.
This disorganization is fruitful precisely because it allows for individuality (cf. Horkheimer). However, it is also inefficient and easy to corrupt. Hmm.
Against this, not all knowledge is situated. Some is universal. It’s universality is due to its pragmatic usefulness in technical design. Since technical design acts on everyone even when their own situated understanding does not include it, this kind of knowledge has universal ground (in violence, sadly, but maybe also in other ways.)
The question is whether there is room anywhere in the technically correct understanding of social organization (something we might see in Beniger) there is room for the articulation of what it supposed to be great and worthy of man (see Horkheimer).
I have thought for a long time that there is probably something like this describable in terms of complexity theory.