The paradigmatic case of transaction cost economics (TCE) is the make-or-buy decision. A firm, F, needs something, C. Do they make it in-house or do they buy it from somewhere else?
If the firm makes it in-house, they will incur some bureaucratic overhead costs in addition to the costs of production. But they will also be able to specialize C for their purposes. They can institute their own internal quality controls. And so on.
If the firm buys it on the open market from some other firm, say, G, they don’t pay the overhead costs. They do lose the benefits of specialization, and the quality controls are only those based on economic competitive pressure on suppliers.
There is an intermediate option, which is a contract between F and G which establishes an ongoing relationship between the two firms. This contract creates a field in which C can be specialized for F, and there can be assurances of quality, while the overhead is distributed efficiently between F and G.
This situation is both extremely common in business practice and not well handled by neoclassical, orthodox economics. It’s the case that TCE is tremendously preoccupied with.
My background and research is in the software industry, which is rife with cases like these.
Developers are constantly faced with a decision to make-or-buy software components. In principle, they can developer any component themselves. In practice, this is rarely cost-effective.
In software, open source software components are a prevalent solution to this problem. This can be thought of as a very strange market where all the prices are zero. The most popular open source libraries are very generic , having little “asset specificity” in TCE terms.
The lack of contract between developers and open source components/communities is sometimes seen as a source of hazard in using open source components. The recent event-stream hack, where an upstream component was injected with malicious code by a developer who had taken over maintaining the package, illustrates the problems of outsourcing technical dependencies without a contract. In this case, the quality problem is manifest as a supply chain cybersecurity problem.
In Williamson’s analysis, these kinds of hazards are what drive firms away from purchasing on spot markets and towards contracting or in-house development. In practice, the role of open source support companies fills the role of being a responsible entity G that firm F can build a relationship with.