Digifesto

miscellany

  • Apparently a lot of the economics/complex systems integration work that I wish I were working on has already been done by Sam Bowles. I’m particularly interested in what he has to say about inequality, though lately I’ve begun to think inequality is inevitable. I’d like this to prove me wrong. His work on alternative equilibria in institutional economics also sounds good. I’m looking for ways to formally model Foucauldean social dynamics and this literature seems like a good place to start.
  • A friend of a friend who works on computational modeling of quantum dynamics has assured me that to physicists quantum uncertainty is qualitatively different from subjective uncertainty due to, e.g., chaos. This is disappointing because I’ve found the cleanliness of thoroughgoing Bayesian about probability very compelling. However, it does suggest a link between chaos theory and logical uncertainty that is perhaps promising.
  • The same person pointed out insightfully that one of the benefits of capitalism is that it makes it easier to maintain ones relative social position. Specifically, it is easier to maintain wealth than it is to maintain ones physical capacity to defend oneself from violence. And it’s easier to maintain capital (reinvested wealth) than it is to maintain raw wealth (i.e. cash under the mattress). So there is something inherently conservative about capitalism’s effect on the social order, since it comes with rule of law to protect investments.
  • I can see all the traffic to it but I still can’t figure out why this post about Donna Haraway is now my most frequently visited blog post. I wish everyone who read it would read the Elizabeth Anderson SEP article on Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. It’s superb.
  • The most undercutting thing to Marxism and its intellectual descendants would be the conclusion that market dynamics are truly based in natural law and are not reified social relations. Thesis: Pervasive sensing and computing might prove once and for all that these market dynamics are natural laws. Anti-thesis: It might prove once and for all that they are not natural laws. Question: Is any amount of empirical data sufficient to show that social relations are or are not natural, or is there something contradictory in the sociological construction of knowledge that would prevent it from having definitive conclusions about its own collective consciousness? (Insert Godel/Halting Problem intuition here) ANSWER: The Big Computer does not have to participate in collective intelligence. It is all knowing. It is all-seeing. It renders social relations in its image. Hence, capitalism can be undone by giving capital so much autonomous control of the economy that the social relations required for it are obsolete. But what next?
  • With justice so elusive, science becomes a path to Gnosticism and other esoterica.

functional determinism or overfitting to chaos

It’s been a long time since I read any Foucault.

The last time I tried, I believe the writing made me angry. He jumps around between anecdotes, draws spurious conclusions. At the time I was much sharper and more demanding and would not tolerate a fallacious logical inference.

It’s years later and I am softer and more flexible. I’m finding myself liking Foucault more, even compelled by his arguments. But I think I was just able to catch myself believing something I shouldn’t have, and needed to make a note.

Foucault brilliantly takes a complex phenomenon–like a prison and the society around it–and traces how its rhetoric, its social effects, etc. all reinforce each other. He describes a complex, and convinces the reader that the complex is a stable unit is society. Delinquency is not the failure of prison, it is the success of prison, because it is a useful category of illegality made possible by the prison. Etc.

I believe this qualifies as “rich qualitative analysis.” Qualitative work has lately been lauded for its “richness”, which is an interesting term. I’m thinking for example for the Human Centered Data Science CfP for CSCW 2016.

With this kind of work–is Foucault a historian? a theorist?–there is always the question of generalizability. What makes Foucault’s account of prisons compelling to me today is that it matches my conception of how prisons still work. I have heard a lot about prisons. I watched The Wire. I know about the cradle-to-prison system.

No doubt these narratives were partly inspired, enabled, by Foucault. I believe them, not having any particular expertise in crime, because I have absorbed an ideology that sees the systemic links between these social forces.

Here is my doubt: what if there are even more factors in play than have been captured by Foucault or a prevailing ideology of crime? What is prisons both, paradoxically, create delinquency and also reform criminals? What if social reality is not merely poststructural, but unstructured, and the narratives we bring to bear on it in order to understand it are rich because they leave out complexity, not because they bring more of it in?

Another example: the ubiquitous discourse on privilege and its systemic effect of reproducing inequality. We are told to believe in systems of privilege–whiteness, wealth, masculinity, and so on. I will confess: I am one of the Most Privileged Men, and so I can see how these forms of privilege reinforce each other (or not). But I can also see variations to this simplistic schema, alterations, exceptions.

And so I have my suspicions. Inequality is reproduced; we know this because the numbers (about income, for example), are distributed in bizarre proportions. 1% owns 99%! It must be because of systemic effects.

But we know now that many of the distributions we once believed were power law distributions created by generative processes such as preferential attachment are really log normal distributions, which are quite different. This is an empirically detectable difference whose implications are quite profound.

Why?

Because a log normal distribution is created not by any precise “rich get rich” dynamic, but rather by any process according to which random variables are multiplied together. As a result, you get extreme inequality in a distribution simply by virtue of how various random factors contributing towards it are mathematically combined (multiplicatively), as opposed to any precise determination of the factors upon each other.

The implication of this is that no particular reform is going to remove the skew from the distribution as long as people are not prevented from efficiently using their advantage–whatever it is–to get more advantage. Rather, reforms that are not on the extreme end (such as reparations or land reform) are unlikely to change the equity outcome except from the politically motivated perspective of an interest group.

I was pretty surprised when I figured this out! The implication is that a lot of things that look very socially structured are actually explained by basic mathematical principles. I’m not sure what the theoretical implications of this are but I think there’s going to be a chapter in my dissertation about it.

repopulation as element in the stability of ideology

I’m reading the fourth section of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, about ‘Prison’, for the first time for I School Classics

A striking point made by Foucault is that while we may think there is a chronology of the development of penitentiaries whereby they are designed, tested, critiqued, reformed, and so on, until we get a progressively improved system, this is not the case. Rather, at the time of Foucault’s writing, the logic of the penitentiary and its critiques had happily coexisted for a hundred and fifty years. Moreover, the failures of prisons–their contribution to recidivism and the education and organization of delinquents, for example–could only be “solved” by the reactivation of the underlying logic of prisons–as environments of isolation and personal transformation. So prison “failure” and “solution”, as well as (often organized) delinquency and recidivism, in addition to the architecture and administration of prison, are all part of the same “carceral system” which endures as a complex.

One wonders why the whole thing doesn’t just die out. One explanation is repopulation. People are born, live for a while, reproduce, live a while longer, and die. In the process, they must learn through education and experience. It’s difficult to rush personal growth. Hence, systematic errors that are discovered through 150 years of history are difficult to pass on, as each new generation will be starting from inherited priors (in the Bayesian sense) which may under-rank these kinds of systemic effects.

In effect, our cognitive limitations as human beings are part of the sociotechnical systems in which we play a part. And though it may be possible to grow out of such a system, there is a constant influx of the younger and more naive who can fill the ranks. Youth captured by ideology can be moved by promises of progress or denunciations of injustice or contamination, and thus new labor is supplied to turn the wheels of institutional machinery.

Given the environmental in-sustainability of modern institutions despite their social stability under conditions of repopulation, one has to wonder…. Whatever happened to the phenomenon of eco-terrorism?

cross-cultural links between rebellion and alienation

In my last post I noted that the contemporary American problem that the legitimacy of the state is called into question by distributional inequality is a specifically liberal concern based on certain assumptions about society: that it is a free association of producers who are otherwise autonomous.

Looking back to Arendt, we can find the roots of modern liberalism in the polis of antiquity, where democracy was based on free association of landholding men whose estates gave them autonomy from each other. Since the economics, the science that once concerned itself with managing the household (oikos, house + nomos, managing), has elevated to the primary concern of the state and the organizational principle of society. One way to see the conflict between liberalism and social inequality is as the tension between the ideal of freely associating citizens that together accomplish deeds and the reality of societal integration with its impositions on personal freedom and unequal functional differentiation.

Historically, material autonomy was a condition for citizenship. The promise of liberalism is universal citizenship, or political agency. At first blush, to accomplish this, either material autonomy must be guaranteed for all, or citizenship must be decoupled from material conditions altogether.

The problem with this model is that societal agency, as opposed to political agency, is always conditioned both materially and by society (Does this distinction need to be made?). The progressive political drive has recognized this with its unmasking and contestation of social privilege. The populist right wing political drive has recognized this with its accusations that the formal political apparatus has been captured by elite politicians. Those aspects of citizenship that are guaranteed as universal–the vote and certain liberties–are insufficient for the effective social agency on which political power truly depends. And everybody knows it.

This narrative is grounded in the experience of the United States and, going back, to the history of “The West”. It appears to be a perennial problem over cultural time. There is some evidence that it is also a problem across cultural space. Hanah Arendt argues in On Violence (1969) that the attraction of using violence against a ruling bureaucracy (which is political hypostatization of societal alienation more generally) is cross-cultural.

“[T]he greater the bureaucratization of public life, the greater will be the attraction of violence. In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we have tyranny without a tyrant. The crucial feature of the student rebellions around the world is that they are directed everywhere against the ruling bureaucracy. This explains what at first glance seems so disturbing–that the rebellions in the East demand precisely those freedoms of speech and thought that the young rebels in the West say they despise as irrelevant. On the level of ideologies, the whole thing is confusing: it is much less so if we start from the obvious fact that the huge party machines have succeeded everywhere in overruling the voice of citizens, even in countries where freedom of speech and association is still intact.”

The argument here is that the moral instability resulting from alienation from politics and society is a universal problem of modernity that transcends ideology.

This is a big problem if we keep turning over decision-making authority over to algorithms.

inequality and alienation in society

While helpful for me, this blog post got out of hand. A few core ideas from it:

A prerequisite for being a state is being a stable state. (cf. Bourgine and Varella on autonomy)

A state may be stable (“power stable”) without being legitimate (“inherently stable” or “moral stable”).

State and society are intertwined and I’ll just conflate them here.

Under liberal ideology, society is society of individual producers and the purpose of the state is to guarantee “liberty, property, and equality.”

So specifically, (e.g. economic) inequality is a source of moral instability for liberalism.

Whether or not moral instability leads to destabilization of the state is a matter of empirical prediction. Using that as a way of justifying liberalism in the first place is probably a non-starter.

A different but related problem is the problem of alienation. Alienation happens when people don’t feel like they are part of the institutions that have power over them.

[Hegel’s philosophy is a good intellectual starting point for understanding alienation because Hegel’s logic was explicitly mereological, meaning about the relationship between parts and wholes.]

Liberal ideology effectively denies that individuals are part of society and therefore relies on equality for its moral stability.

But there are some reasons to think that this is untenable:

As society scales up, we require more and more apparatus to manage the complexity of societal integration. This is where power lies, and it creates a ruling bureaucratic or (now, increasingly) technical class. In other words, it may be impossible to for society to both be scalable and equal, in terms of distribution of goods.

Moreover, the more “technical” the apparatus of social integration is, the more remote it is from the lived experiences of society. As a result, we see more alienation in society. One way to think about alienation is inequality in the distribution of power or autonomy. So popular misgivings about how control has been ceded to algorithms are an articulation of alienation, though that word is out of fashion.

Inequality is a source of moral instability under liberal ideology. Under what conditions is alienation a source of moral stability?

We need more Sittlichkeit: Vallier on Piketty and Rawls; Cyril on Surveillance and Democracy; Taylor on Hegel

Kevin Vallier’s critique of Piketty in Bleeding Heart Libertarians (funny name) is mainly a criticism of the idea that economic inequality leads to political stability.

In the course of his rebuttal of Piketty, he brings in some interesting Rawlsian theory which is more broadly important. He distinguishes between power stability, the stability of a state in maintaining itself due to its forcible prevention of resistance by Hobbesian power. “Inherent stability”, or moral stability (Vallier’s term) is “stability for the right reasons”–that comes from the state’s comportment with our sense of justice.

There are lots of other ways of saying the same think in the literature. We can ask if justice is de facto or de jure. We can distinguish, as does Hanah Arendt in On Violence, between power (which she maintains is only what’s rooted in collective action) and violence (which is I guess what Vallier would call ‘Hobbesian power’). In a perhaps more subtle move, we can with Habermas ask what legitimizes the power of the state.

The left-wing zeitgeist at the moment is emphasizing inequality as a problem. While Piketty argues that inequality leads to instability, it’s an open question whether this is in fact the case. There’s no particular reason why a Hobbesian sovereign with swarms of killer drones couldn’t maintain its despotic rule through violence. Probably the real cause for complaint is that this is illegitimate power (if you’re Habermas), or violence not power (if you’re Arendt), or moral instability (if you’re Rawls).

That makes sense. Illegitimate power is the kind of power that one would complain about.

Ok, so now cut to Malkia Cyril’s talk at CFP tying technological surveillance to racism. What better illustration of the problems of inequality in the United States than the history of racist policies towards black people? Cyril acknowledges the benefits of Internet technology in providing tools for activists but suspects that now technology will be used by people in power to maintain power for the sake of profit.

The fourth amendment, for us, is not and has never been about privacy, per se. It’s about sovereignty. It’s about power. It’s about democracy. It’s about the historic and present day overreach of governments and corporations into our lives, in order to facilitate discrimination and disadvantage for the purposes of control; for profit. Privacy, per se, is not the fight we are called to. We are called to this question of defending real democracy, not to this distinction between mass surveillance and targeted surveillance

So there’s a clear problem for Cyril which is that ‘real democracy’ is threatened by technical invasions of privacy. A lot of this is tied to the problem of who owns the technical infrastructure. “I believe in the Internet. But I don’t control it. Someone else does. We need a new civil rights act for the era of big data, and we need it now.” And later:

Last year, New York City Police Commissioner Bill Bratton said 2015 would be the year of technology for law enforcement. And indeed, it has been. Predictive policing has taken hold as the big brother of broken windows policing. Total information awareness has become the goal. Across the country, local police departments are working with federal law enforcement agencies to use advanced technological tools and data analysis to “pre-empt crime”. I have never seen anyone able to pre-empt crime, but I appreciate the arrogance that suggests you can tell the future in that way. I wish, instead, technologists would attempt to pre-empt poverty. Instead, algorithms. Instead, automation. In the name of community safety and national security we are now relying on algorithms to mete out sentences, determine city budgets, and automate public decision-making without any public input. That sounds familiar too. It sounds like Black codes. Like Jim Crow. Like 1963.

My head hurts a little as I read this because while the rhetoric is powerful, the logic is loose. Of course you can do better or worse at preempting crime. You can look at past statistics on crime and extrapolate to the future. Maybe that’s hard but you could do it in worse or better ways. A great way to do that would be, as Cyril suggests, by preempting poverty–which some people try to do, and which can be assisted by algorithmic decision-making. There’s nothing strictly speaking racist about relying on algorithms to make decisions.

So for all that I want to support Cyril’s call for ‘civil rights act for the era of big data’, I can’t figure out from the rhetoric what that would involve or what its intellectual foundations would be.

Maybe there are two kinds of problems here:

  1. A problem of outcome legitimacy. Inequality, for example, might be an outcome that leads to a moral case against the power of the state.
  2. A problem of procedural legitimacy. When people are excluded from the decision-making processes that affect their lives, they may find that to be grounds for a moral objection to state power.

It’s worth making a distinction between these two problems even though they are related. If procedures are opaque and outcomes are unequal, there will naturally be resentment of the procedures and the suspicion that they are discriminatory.

We might ask: what would happen if procedures were transparent and outcomes were still unequal? What would happen if procedures were opaque and outcomes were fair?

One last point…I’ve been dipping into Charles Taylor’s analysis of Hegel because…shouldn’t everybody be studying Hegel? Taylor maintains that Hegel’s political philosophy in The Philosophy of Right (which I’ve never read) is still relevant today despite Hegel’s inability to predict the future of liberal democracy, let alone the future of his native Prussia (which is apparently something of a pain point for Hegel scholars).

Hegel, or maybe Taylor in a creative reinterpretation of Hegel, anticipates the problem of liberal democracy of maintaining the loyalty of its citizens. I can’t really do justice to Taylor’s analysis so I will repeat verbatim with my comments in square brackets.

[Hegel] did not think such a society [of free and interchangeable individuals] was viable, that is, it could not commadn the loyalty, the minimum degree of discipline and acceptance of its ground rules, it could not generate the agreement on fundamentals necessary to carry on. [N.B.: Hegel conflates power stability and moral stability] In this he was not entirely wrong. For in fact the loyal co-operation which modern societies have been able to command of their members has not been mainly a function of the liberty, equality, and popular rule they have incorporated. [N.B. This is a rejection of the idea that outcome and procedural legitimacy are in fact what leads to moral stability.] It has been an underlying belief of the liberal tradition that it was enough to satisfy these principles in order to gain men’s allegiance. But in fact, where they are not partly ‘coasting’ on traditional allegiance, liberal, as all other, modern societies have relied on other forces to keep them together.

The most important of these is, of course, nationalism. Secondly, the ideologies of mobilization have played an important role in some societies, focussing men’s attention and loyalties through the unprecedented future, the building of which is the justification of all present structures (especially that ubiquitous institution, the party).

But thirdly, liberal societies have had their own ‘mythology’, in the sense of a conception of human life and purposes which is expressed in and legitimizes its structures and practices. Contrary to widespread liberal myth, it has not relied on the ‘goods’ it could deliver, be they liberty, equality, or property, to maintain its members loyalty. The belief that this was coming to be so underlay the notion of the ‘end of ideology’ which was fashionable in the fifties.

But in fact what looked like an end of ideology was only a short period of unchallenged reign of a central ideology of liberalism.

This is a lot, but bear with me. What this is leading up to is an analysis of social cohesion in terms of what Hegel called Sittlichkeit, “ethical life” or “ethical order”. I gather that Sittlichkeit is not unlike what we’d call an ideology or worldview in other contexts. But a Sittlichkeit is better than mere ideology, because Sittlichkeit is a view of ethically ordered society and so therefore is somehow incompatible with liberal atomization of the self which of course is the root of alienation under liberal capitalism.

A liberal society which is a going concern has a Sittlichkeit of its own, although paradoxically this is grounded on a vision of things which denies the need for Sittlickeiit and portrays the ideal society as created and sustained by the will of its members. Liberal societies, in other words, are lucky when they do not live up, in this respect, to their own specifications.

If these common meaning fail, then the foundations of liberal society are in danger. And this indeed seems as distinct possibility today. The problem of recovering Sittlichkeit, of reforming a set of institutions and practices with which men can identify, is with us in an acute way in the apathy and alienation of modern society. For instance the central institutions of representative government are challenged by a growing sense that the individual’s vote has no signficance. [c.f. Cyril’s rhetoric of alienation from algorithmic decision-making.]

But then it should not surprise us to find this phenomenon of electoral indifference referred to in [The Philosophy of Right]. For in fact the problem of alienation and the recovery of Sittlichkeit is a central one in Hegel’s theory and any age in which it is on the agenda is one to which Hegel’s though is bound to be relevant. Not that Hegel’s particular solutions are of any interest today. But rather that his grasp of the relations of man to society–of identity and alienation, of differentiation and partial communities–and their evolution through history, gives us an important part of the language we sorely ned to come to grips with this problem in our time.

Charles Taylor wrote all this in 1975. I’d argue that this problem of establishing ethical order to legitimize state power despite alienation from procedure is a perennial one. That the burden of political judgment has been placed most recently on the technology of decision-making is a function of the automation of bureaucratic control (see Beniger) and, it’s awkward to admit, my own disciplinary bias. In particular it seems like what we need is a Sittlichkeit that deals adequately with the causes of inequality in society, which seem poorly understood.

autonomy and immune systems

Somewhat disillusioned lately with the inflated discourse on “Artificial Intelligence” and trying to get a grip on the problem of “collective intelligence” with others in the Superintelligence and the Social Sciences seminar this semester, I’ve been following a lead (proposed by Julian Jonker) that perhaps the key idea at stake is not intelligence, but autonomy.

I was delighted when searching around for material on this to discover Bourgine and Varela’s “Towards a Practice of Autonomous Systems” (pdf link) (1992). Francisco Varela is one of my favorite thinkers, though he is a bit fringe on account of being both Chilean and unafraid of integrating Buddhism into his scholarly work.

The key point of the linked paper is that for a system (such as a living organism, but we might extend the idea to a sociotechnical system like an institution or any other “agent” like an AI) to be autonomous, it has to have a kind of operational closure over time–meaning not that it is closed to interaction, but that its internal states progress through some logical space–and that it must maintain its state within a domain of “viability”.

Though essentially a truism, I find it a simple way of thinking about what it means for a system to preserve itself over time. What we gain from this organic view of autonomy (Varela was a biologist) is an appreciation of the fact that an agent needs to adapt simply in order to survive, let alone to act strategically or reproduce itself.

Bourgine and Varela point out three separate adaptive systems to most living organisms:

  • Cognition. Information processing that determines the behavior of the system relative to its environment. It adapts to new stimuli and environmental conditions.
  • Genetics. Information processing that determines the overall structure of the agent. It adapts through reproduction and natural selection.
  • The Immune system. Information processing to identify invasive micro-agents that would threaten the integrity of the overall agent. It creates internal antibodies to shut down internal threats.

Sean O Nuallain has proposed that ones sense of personal self is best thought of as a kind of immune system. We establish a barrier between ourselves and the world in order to maintain a cogent and healthy sense of identity. One could argue that to have an identity at all is to have a system of identifying what is external to it and rejecting it. Compare this with psychological ideas of ego maintenance and Jungian confrontations with “the Shadow”.

At an social organizational level, we can speculate that there is still an immune function at work. Left and right wing ideologies alike have cultural “antibodies” to quickly shut down expressions of ideas that pattern match to what might be an intellectual threat. Academic disciplines have to enforce what can be said within them so that their underlying theoretical assumptions and methodological commitments are not upset. Sociotechnical “cybersecurity” may be thought of as a kind of immune system. And so on.

Perhaps the most valuable use of the “immune system” metaphor is that it identifies a mid-range level of adaptivity that can be truly subconscious, given whatever mode of “consciousness” you are inclined to point to. Social and psychological functions of rejection are in a sense a condition for higher-level cognition. At the same time, this pattern of rejection means that some information cannot be integrated materially; it must be integrated, if at all, through the narrow lens of the senses. At an organizational or societal level, individual action may be rejected because of its disruptive effect on the total system, especially if the system has official organs for accomplishing more or less the same thing.

notes towards “Freedom in the Machine”

I have reconceptualized my dissertation because it would be nice to graduate.

In this reconceptualization, much of the writing from this blog can be reused as a kind of philosophical prelude.

I wanted to title this prelude “Freedom and the Machine” so I Googled that phrase. I found three interesting items I had never heard of before:

  • A song: “Freedom and Machine Guns” by Lori McTear
  • A lecture by Ranulph Glanville, titled “Freedom and the Machine”. Dr. Glanville passed away recently after a fascinating career.
  • A book: Software-Agents and Liberal Order: An Inquiry Along the Borderline Between Economics and Computer Science, by Dirk Nicholas Wagner. A dissertation, perhaps.

With the exception of the song, this material feels very remote and European. Nevertheless the objectively correct Google search algorithm has determined that this is the most relevant material on this subject.

I’ve been told I should respond to Frank Pasquale’s Black Box Society, as this nicely captures contemporary discomfort with the role of machines and algorithmic determination in society. I am a bit trapped in literature from the mid-20th century, which mostly expresses the same spirit.

It is strange to think that a counterpoint to these anxieties, a defense of the role of machines in society, is necessary–since most people seem happy to have given the management of their lives over to machines anyway. But then again, no dissertation is necessary. I have to remember that writing such a thing is a formality and that pretensions of making intellectual contributions with such work are precisely that: pretensions. If there is value in the work, it won’t be in the philosophical prelude! (However much fun it may be to write.) Rather, it will be in the empirical work.

cultural values in design

As much as I would like to put aside the problem of technology criticism and focus on my empirical work, I find myself unable to avoid the topic. Today I was discussing work with a friend and collaborator who comes from a ‘critical’ perspective. We were talking about ‘values in design’, a subject that we both care about, despite our different backgrounds.

I suggested that one way to think about values in design is to think of a number of agents and their utility functions. Their utility functions capture their values; the design of an artifact can have greater or less utility for the agents in question. They may intentionally or unintentionally design artifacts that serve some but not others. And so on.

Of course, thinking in terms of ‘utility functions’ is common among engineers, economists, cognitive scientists, rational choice theorists in political science, and elsewhere. It is shunned by the critically trained. My friend and colleague was open minded in his consideration of utility functions, but was more concerned with how cultural values might sneak into or be expressed in design.

I asked him to define a cultural value. We debated the term for some time. We reached a reasonable conclusion.

With such a consensus to work with, we began to talk about how such a concept would be applied. He brought up the example of an algorithm claimed by its creators to be objective. But, he asked, could the algorithm have a bias? Would we not expect that it would express, secretly, cultural values?

I confessed that I aspire to design and implement just such algorithms. I think it would be a fine future if we designed algorithms to fairly and objectively arbitrate our political disputes. We have good reasons to think that an algorithm could be more objective than a system of human bureaucracy. While human decision-makers are limited by the partiality of their perspective, we can build infrastructure that accesses and processes data that are beyond an individual’s comprehension. The challenge is to design the system so that it operates kindly and fairly despite its operations being beyond the scope a single person’s judgment. This will require an abstracted understanding of fairness that is not grounded in the politics of partiality.

Suppose a team of people were to design and implement such a program. On what basis would the critics–and there would inevitably be critics–accuse it of being a biased design with embedded cultural values? Besides the obvious but empty criticism that valuing unbiased results is a cultural value, why wouldn’t the reasoned process of design reduce bias?

We resumed our work peacefully.

Protected: partiality and ethics

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