some PLSC 2020 notes: one framing of the managerialism puzzle

PLSC 2020 was quite interesting this year.

There were a number of threads I’d like to follow up on. One of them has to do with managerialism and the ability of the state (U.S. in this context) to regulate industry.

I need to do some reading to fill some gaps in my understanding, but this is how I understand the puzzle so far.

Suppose the state wants to regulate industry. Congress passes a bill creating an agency with regulatory power with some broadly legislated mandate. The agency comes up with regulations. Businesses then implement policies to comply with the regulation. That’s how it’s supposed to go.

But in practice, there is a lot of translational work being done here. The broadly legislated mandate will be in a language that can get passed by Congress. It delegates elaboration on the specifics to the expert regulators in the agency; these regulators might be lawyers. But when the corporate bosses get the regulations (maybe from their policy staff, also lawyers?) they begin to work with it in a “managerialist” way. This means, I gather, that they manage the transition towards compliance, but in a way that minimizes the costs of compliance. If they can comply without adhering to the purpose of the regulation–which might be ever-so-clear to the lawyers who dreamed it up–so be it.

This seems all quite obvious. Of course it would work this way. If I gather correctly at this point (and maybe I don’t), the managerialist problem is: because of the translational work going on between legislate intent through to administrative regulation into corporate policy into implementation, there’s a lot of potential to have information “lost in translation”, and this information loss works to the advantage of the regulated corporation, because it is using all that lost regulatory bandwidth to its advantage.