Digifesto

Tag: politics

brief theses on wealth and value

There’s a longer version of this argument to be made, but I wanted to see if I could present it briefly.

  1. What is wealth?
  2. Nominal financial worth — in terms of, e.g. US dollars, and other fiat currency, is clearly not a good measure of wealth.
    • Because it is often based on speculative pricing.
    • Because it is vulnerable to inflation.
    • Because of all kinds of market irregularities and exogenous shocks that are not ‘priced in’.
  3. Purchasing power or exchange value of owned assets is not a coherent measure of wealth, because that would not direct which trades are favorable.
    • A practical consequence of a theory of wealth is that it should provide a guide as to what sorts of things are comparatively worth having; this is a quite different question from which trades are tactically advantageous for accumulation.
  4. Macroeconomic theory provides an interesting answer:
    • The economy creates ‘value’, which is stored in assets that people own.
    • This value is ultimately, well, valuable, when it is consumed — destroyed — which provides utility to the consumer.
    • Wealth is thus a store of potential utility attain through the destruction of wealth.
    • It has been said that this is a ‘thermodynamic’ theory, because utility realization is a form of ‘entropy’. Energy is constant until it is lost.
  5. This macroeconomic theory is also a bad theory of wealth.
    • Nobody really believes the foolish idea that what people most prefer is the thermodynamic destruction of what is valuable.
    • To the extent that this is the prevailing scientific theory that our society is built around, it’s a disastrous one.
    • It’s appalling that, given what’s at stake in ‘the economy’, the world hasn’t come up with a better theory.
    • I think this is largely a methods technology issue, and that motivates a lot of my current research, but I digress.
  6. Some good things about this macroeconomic theory of wealth:
    • Wealth is a store of value, where ‘storage’ is due to the situatedness of wealth in a larger system of exchange.
    • The value is realized by personal needs or preferences.
  7. What do people actually want or need?
    • It’s not setting valuable things on fire — most of the time.
    • The big idea: the intrinsic motivation of all things is self-preservation over time.
      • This is conatus to Hobbes and Spinoza.
      • This is at the heart of enactivist psychology, and the connection between constitutive autonomy and intrinsic motivation.
        • (Christoph Salge and I are working on a book chapter about this, connecting it to AI legal responsibility. But I think this point also applies to economic theory.)
    • Self-preservation of (dynamic) systems actually requires very good energy retention, or Weiner’s negentropy, not entropy. Utility is about life continuation, not fireworks.
      • (Ok, it is a little of both.)
    • Implications:
      • “Health is wealth.”
      • “Sustainability” is wealth.
  8. A mathematically coherent, falsifiable theory of human and economic behavior that tracked the right variables for measuring wealth would be good.
    • It could help households make better decisions.
    • It could help governments make better decisions.
    • It could help businesses make better decisions.
    • I expect that this does not imply a very radical change in how accounting is done. Rather, I think it’s a meaningful but subtle distinction worth making.

In other news, we’re exploring solar panels on our house, and will finally improve our insulation and windows this year. These kind of home improvements for energy efficiency are subsidized by the federal government and state of New York, and this is wise policy. I believe this is aligned with this ‘theory of wealth’, since energy efficient residential real estate is perhaps the sina qua non of wealth in the sense articulated here.

some philosophical progress, and next steps

I had a wonderful time at FAccT 2026 in Montreal. I was at the first FAT* in 2018 and thought it was doing something important — creating an intellectual space for serious thinking about powerful socio-technical systems in a way that’s consistent with computational thinking. Prior to that conference, I didn’t know where to publish work along those lines. This year was my third time publishing at it, second time presenting. This year, I presented a paper that was all about causal modeling in service of privacy-by-design, which brings closure on a long engagement with trying to mathematize social norms. I’m satisfied by how we did this, and the approach is very extensible. I intend to build on it in various ways for the rest of my career.

At one moment of the conference, in one of the socials, there was a bit of a philosophical exchange. I discovered that I am not the only person in the world that subscribes to both enactivist and transcendental pragmatist principles, and in fact these approaches seemed to be an increasingly good fit for the direction of the field, though I did hear Agre and postmodernism mentioned a few times.

So, happily, I’m feeling settled in what have been my two greatest intellectual preoccupations: the question of what is true, and the question of what is right or good. Provisionally — and I suppose this sort of thing is always provisional — I feel well educated on these matters, and have tested several theories, and been wrong enough times, to have a rough idea of the right methods for approaching these problems. I’ve made a good deal of progress by accepting, with some humility, that there is maybe not so much room for innovation in these areas as one might have hoped in earlier years. The conclusions (so far) of the process of inquiry are mundane, not spectacular or ‘radical’. However, it is comforting to have greater confidence in common sense than I once did.

To try to put it briefly, I think the following is the case. We are individually and collectively alive, and this is a condition for our knowledge and relationships with others. Knowledge, and cognition more generally, is a process of adaptation whereby a living system responds to change and maintains viability over time, as it is structurally coupled with their environment. An individual’s mental habits are those that survive experience and inquiry and, above all, maintain the life of the individual. The ‘contents’ of the mental states of the individual are those representations, coupled bodily with the environment, which capture useful sensorimotor regularities of their local world. In this sense, knowledge is embodied, personal, and particular, at the individual, ‘ontogenic’ level. (This is all ‘enactivism’ in a nutshell; it is also ‘pragmatism’ in Peirce’s sense; and something borrowed from traditional philosophy of mind.)

However, no individual exists alone. We are born with chromosomes from two parents. We are raised, live, and die in society. The collective social organism is also alive, and must maintain its viability over time. The development of language, institutions, communication systems — including the legal system, property laws, and markets — are a kind of ‘cognition’ at the collective, or ‘phylogenic” level. It is at this level ‘objectivity’ is constructed; knowledge can be ‘transcendent’ of individual bodies because its meaning comes from its use in social forms. As a specific accomplishment of certain kinds of social systems, we get general representations of the world that are reliably ‘true’. And, as a specific accomplishment of certain other kinds of social systems, we can get representations of social behavior that are reliably ‘good’ or ‘right’, mainly because they interactively maintain the viability of the collective, and the individual, dependent on it, within it. Considering society decomposed into separate mutually supportive but distinctly personal spheres of activity, we get Contextual Integrity, and the implied norms of personal information flow. Considering society in its broadest sense, we get Dewey’s notions of social democracy, and ultimately Habermasian notions of legal legitimacy.

Thus construed, we have lots of room to improve ourselves in both knowledge and wisdom. This is primarily achieved by the improvement of institutions and social forms, as these are the harnesses which distinctly embodied agents create objective representations. Computational social science remains a worthy pursuit as a means to these ends. The ultimate end is survival and flourishing of humanity — one’s descendants, one’s society, one’s ecosystem — which is an intrinsic motivation which grounds the whole process transcendentally.

I’m grateful to Christoph Salge for working with me on a paper about enactivism and the legal responsibility of AI systems, which has refined and improved my confidence in these points.

The above is, I suppose, all well and good, but it’s incomplete in at least two respects, which I find bothersome. These two issues are at the heart of many of today’s deepest political conflicts, and I suppose they reflect inherent instabilities in the characterization of truth and goodness described above.

The first is the problem of tribes, or nations. Individuals can to some extent choose which collectives they are loyal to, and social collectives come into conflict. Universalist ethics are a longstanding ideal, but frequently come into conflict with particularist loyalties to tribe, race, state, etc. Some amount of loyalty to family seems essential for viability and is broadly good. When tribal conflict leads to war or subjugation, that is often not good. There is both cooperation and defection by tribes; tribal boundaries are unstable; tribes have their own local knowledge and customs and these can be in conflict with universals. A great deal has been written about this in various fields and I’m finding it so intractable that it has become tedious.

The second is the problem, or solution, of wealth. I’ll admit that I wish I had much more to say about this than I currently do. For one, while I believe I have a pretty good idea of what truth and ethics are, I do not have a similarly grounded concept of what wealth is. And yet, the distribution of wealth is the single greatest political and moral concern of our society, besides, maybe, the relations between tribes. Wealth cannot be the same thing as truth, and it cannot be the same thing as ethics — the tension between the three is obvious; and yet it seems connected to both in intrinsic ways. Some amount of wealth is necessary for the survival and flourishing of the individual and the collective. Wealth is sensitive to institutions — property and liability regimes, markets, and so on — but what makes these institutions proper or desirable? The assumptions of the prevailing theory often seem weak on inspection.

This latter issue is the subject of economics, but I have not yet been able to find economic theory that is on enactivist or systems-theoretic grounding. I have come to the conclusion that it doesn’t exist yet in a convincing or generalizable way, and it’s a problem my work is pointing at. A big methodological gap is in computational methods that are a good fit for the problem. This is what I’m most interested in advancing in the short term.

References

Maturana, H. (1988) Ontology of Observing: The Biological Foundations of Self-Consciousness and of The Physical Domain of Existence. https://reflexus.org/wp-content/uploads/oo3.pdf

Political theories and AI

Through a few new emerging projects and opportunities, I’ve had reason to circle back to the topic of Artificial Intelligence and ethics. I wanted to jot down a few notes as some recent reading and conversations have been clarifying some ideas here.

In my work with Jake Goldenfein on this topic (published 2021), we framed the ethical problem of AI in terms of its challenge to liberalism, which we characterize in terms of individual rights (namely, property and privacy rights), a theory of why the free public market makes the guarantees of these rights sufficient for many social goods, and a more recent progressive or egalitarian tendency. We then discuss how AI technologies challenge liberalism and require us to think about post-liberal configurations of society and computation.

A natural reaction to this paper, especially given the political climate in the United States, is “aren’t the alternatives to liberalism even worse?” and it’s true that we do not in that paper outline an alternative to liberalism which a world with AI might aspire to.

John Mearsheimer’s The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018) is a clearly written treatise on political theory. Mearsheimer rose to infamy in 2022 after the Russian invasion of Ukraine because of widely circulated videos of a lecture in 2015 in which he argued that the fault for Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 was due to U.S. foreign policy. It is because of that infamy that I’ve decided to read The Great Delusion, which was a Financial Times Best Book of 2018. The Financial Times editorials have since turned on Mearsheimer. We’ll see what they say about him in another four years. However politically unpopular he may be, I found his points interesting and have decided to look at his more scholarly work. I have not been disappointed, and find that he clearly articulates political philosophy I will use these articulations. I won’t analyze his international relations theory here.

Putting Mearsheimer’s international relations theories entirely aside for now, I’ve been pleased to find The Great Delusion to be a thorough treatise on political theory, and it goes to lengths in Chapter 3 to describe liberalism as a political theory (which will be its target). Mearsheimer distinguished between four different political ideologies, citing many of their key intellectual proponents.

  • Modus vivendi liberalism. (Locke, Smith, Hayek) A theory committed to individual negative rights, such as private property and privacy, against the impositions by the state. The state should be minimal, a “night watchman”. This can involve skepticism about the ability of reason to achieve consensus about the nature of the good life; political toleration of differences is implied by the guarantee of negative rights.
  • Progressive liberalism. (Rawls) A theory committed to individual rights, including both negative rights and positive rights, which can be in tension. An example positive right is equal opportunity, which requires interventions by the state in order to guarantee. So the state must play a stronger role. Progressive liberalism involves more faith in reason to achieve consensus about the good life, as progressivism is a positive moral view imposed on others.
  • Utilitarianism. (Bentham, Mill) A theory committed to the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Not committed to individual rights, and therefore not a liberalism per se. Utilitarian analysis can argue for tradeoffs of rights to achieve greater happiness, and is collectivist, not in individualist, in the sense that it is concerned with utility in aggregate.
  • Liberal idealism. (Hobson, Dewey) A theory committed to the realization of an ideal society as an organic unity of functioning subsystem. Not committed to individual rights primarily, so not a liberalism, though individual rights can be justified on ideal grounds. Influenced by Hegelian views about the unity of the state. Sometimes connected to a positive view of nationalism.

This is a highly useful breakdown of ideas, which we can bring back to discussions of AI ethics.

Jake Goldenfein and I wrote about ‘liberalism’ in a way that, I’m glad to say, is consistent with Mearsheimer. We too identity right- and left- wing strands of liberalism. I believe our argument about AI’s challenge to liberal assumptions still holds water.

Utilitarianism is the foundation of one of the most prominent versions of AI ethics today: Effective Altruism. Much has been written about Effective Altruism and its relationship to AI Safety research. I have expressed some thoughts. Suffice it to say here that there is a utilitarian argument that ‘ethics’ should be about prioritizing the prevention of existential risk to humanity, because existential catastrophe would prevent the high-utility outcome of humanity-as-joyous-galaxy-colonizers. AI is seen, for various reasons, to be a potential source of catastrophic risk, and so AI ethics is about preventing these outcomes. Not everybody agrees with this view.

For now, it’s worth mentioning that there is a connection between liberalism and utilitarianism through theories of economics. While some liberals are committed to individual rights for their own sake, or because of negative views about the possibility of rational agreement about more positive political claims, others have argued that negative rights and lack of government intervention lead to better collective outcomes. Neoclassical economics has produced theories and ‘proofs’ to this effect, which rely on mathematical utility theory, which is a successor to philosophical utilitarianism in some respects.

It is also the case that a great deal of AI technology and technical practice is oriented around the vaguely utilitarian goals of ‘utility maximization’, though this is more about the mathematical operationalization of instrumental reason and less about a social commitment to utility as a political goal. AI practice and neoclassical economics are quite aligned in this way. If I were to put the point precisely, I’d say that the reality of AI, by exposing bounded rationality and its role in society, shows that arguments that negative rights are sufficient for utility-maximizing outcomes are naive, and so are a disappointment for liberals.

I was pleased that Mearsheimer brought up what he calls ‘liberal idealism’ in his book, despite it being perhaps a digression from his broader points. I have wondered how to place my own work, which draws heavily on Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of Contextual Integrity (CI), which is heavily influenced by the work of Michael Walzer. CI is based on a view of a society composed of separable spheres, which distinct functions and internally meaningful social goods, which should not be directly exchanged or compared. Walzer has been called a communitarian. I suggest that CI might be best seen as a variation of liberal idealism, in that it orients ethics towards a view of society as an idealized organic unity.

If the present reality of AI is so disappointing, then we must try to imagine a better ideal, and work our way towards it. I’ve found myself reading more and more work, such as by Felix Adler and Alain Badiou, that advocate for the need for an ideal model of society. What we currently are missing is a good computational model of such a society which could do for idealism what neoclassical economics did for liberalism. Which is, namely, to create a blueprint for a policy and science of its realization. If we were to apply AI to the problem of ethics, it would be good to use it this way.

three kinds of social explanation: functionalism, politics, and chaos

Roughly speaking, I think there are three kinds of social explanation. I mean “explanation” in a very thick sense; an explanation is an account of why some phenomenon is the way it is, grounded in some kind of theory that could be used to explain other phenomena as well. To say there are three kinds of social explanation is roughly equivalent to saying there are three ways to model social processes.

The first of these kind of social explanation is functionalism. This explains some social phenomenon in terms of the purpose that it serves. Generally speaking, fulfilling this purpose is seen as necessary for the survival or continuation of the phenomenon. Maybe it simply is the continued survival of the social organism that is its purpose. A kind of agency, though probably very limited, is ascribed to the entire social process. The activity internal to the process is then explained by the purpose that it serves.

The second kind of social explanation is politics. Political explanations focus on the agencies of the participants within the social system and reject the unifying agency of the whole. Explanations based on class conflict or personal ambition are political explanations. Political explanations of social organization make it out to be the result of a complex of incentives and activity. Where there is social regularity, it is because of the political interests of some of its participants in the continuation of the organization.

The third kind of social explanation is hardly an explanation at all. It is explanation by chaos. This sort of explanation is quite rare, as it does not provide much of the psychological satisfaction we like from explanations. I mention it here because I think it is an underutilized mode of explanation. In large populations, much of the activity that happens will do so by chance. Even large organizations may form according to stochastic principles that do not depend on any real kind of coordinated or purposeful effort.

It is important to consider chaotic explanation of social processes when we consider the limits of political expertise. If we have a low opinion of any particular person’s ability to understand their social environment and act strategically, then we must accept that much of their “politically” motivated actions will be based on misconceptions and therefore be, in an objective sense, random. At this point political explanations become facile, and social regularity has to be explained either in terms of the ability of social organizations qua organizations to survive, or the organization must be explained in a deflationary way: i.e., that the organization is not really there, but just in the eye of the beholder.

Reflecting on “Technoscience and Expressionism” by @FractalOntology

I’ve come across Joseph Weissman’s (@FractalOntology) “Technoscience and Expressionism” and am grateful for it, as its filled me in on a philosophical position that I missed the first time around, accelerationism. I’m not a Deleuzian and prefer my analytic texts to plod, so I can’t say I understood all of the essay. On the other hand, I gather the angle of this kind of philosophizing is intentionally psychotherapeutic and hence serves and artistic/literary function rather than one that explicitly guides praxis.

I am curious about the essay because I would like to see a thorough analysis of the political possibilities for the 21st century that gets past 20th century tropes. The passions of journalistic and intellectual debate have an atavistic tendency due to a lack of imagination that I would like to avoid in my own life and work.

Accelerationism looks new. It was pronounced in a manifesto, which is a good start.

Here is a quote from it:

Democracy cannot be defined simply by its means — not via voting, discussion, or general assemblies. Real democracy must be defined by its goal — collective self-​mastery. This is a project which must align politics with the legacy of the Enlightenment, to the extent that it is only through harnessing our ability to understand ourselves and our world better (our social, technical, economic, psychological world) that we can come to rule ourselves. We need to posit a collectively controlled legitimate vertical authority in addition to distributed horizontal forms of sociality, to avoid becoming the slaves of either a tyrannical totalitarian centralism or a capricious emergent order beyond our control. The command of The Plan must be married to the improvised order of The Network.

Hell yeah, the Enlightenment! Sign me up!

The manifesto calls for an end to the left’s emphasis on local action, transparency, and direct democracy. Rather, it calls for a muscular hegemonic left that fully employs and deploys “technoscience”.

It is good to be able to name this political tendency and distinguish it from other left tendencies. It is also good to distinguish it from “right accelerationism”, which Weissman identifies with billionaires who want to create exurb communities.

A left-accelerationist impulse is today playing out dramatically against a right-accelerationist one. And the right-accelerationists are about as dangerous as you may imagine. With silicon valley VCs, and libertarian technologists more generally reading Nick Land on geopolitical fragmentation, the reception or at least receptivity to hard-right accelerants seems problematically open (and the recent $2M campaign proposing the segmentation of California into six microstates seems to provide some evidence for this.) Billionaires consuming hard-right accelerationist materials arguing for hyper-secessionism undoubtedly amounts to a critically dangerous situation. I suspect that the right-accelerationist materials, perspectives, affect, energy expresses a similar shadow, if it is not partly what is catalyzing the resurgence of micro-fascisms elsewhere (and macro ones as well — perhaps most significant to my mind here is the overlap of right-acceleration with white nationalism, and more generally what is deplorably and disingenuously called “race realism” — and is of course simply racism; consider Marine le Pen’s fascist front, which recently won 25% of the seats in the French parliament, UKIP’s resurgence in Great Britain; while we may not hear accelerationist allegiances and watchwords explicitly, the political implications and continuity is at the very least somewhat unsettling…)

There is an unfortunate conflation of several different points of view here. It is too easy to associate racism, wealth, and libertarianism as these are the nightmares of the left’s political imagination. If ideological writing is therapeutic, a way of articulating ones dreams, then this is entirely appropriate with a caveat. The caveat being that every nightmare is a creation of ones own psychology more so than a reflection of the real world.

The same elisions are made by Sam Frank in his recent article thematizing Silicon Valley libertarianism, friendly artificial intelligence research, and contemporary rationalism as a self-help technique. There are interesting organizational ties between these institutions that are validly worth investigating but it would be lazy to collapse vast swathes of the intellectual spectrum into binaries.

In March 2013 I wrote about the Bay Area Rationalists:

There is a good story here, somewhere. If I were a journalist, I would get in on this and publish something about it, just because there is such a great opportunity for sensationalist exploitation.

I would like to say “I called it”–Sam Frank has recently written just such a sensationalist, exploitative piece in Harper’s Magazine. It is thoroughly enjoyable and I wouldn’t say it’s inaccurate. But I don’t think this is the best way to get to know these people. A better one is to attend a CFAR workshop. It used to be that you could avoid the fee with a promise to volunteer, but that there was a money-back guarantee which extended to ones promise to volunteer. If that’s still the case, then one can essentially attend for free.

Another way to engage this community intellectually, which I would encourage the left accelerationists to do because it’s interesting, is to start participating on LessWrong. For some reason this community is not subject to ideological raids like so many other community platforms. I think it could stand for an influx of Deleuze.

Ultimately the left/right divide comes down to a question of distribution of resources and/or surplus. Left accelerationist tactics appear from here to be a more viable way of seizing resources than direct democracy. However, the question is whether accelerationist tactics inevitably result in inequalities that create control structures of the kind originally objected to. In other words, this may simply be politics as usual and nothing radical at all.

So there’s an intersection between these considerations (accelerationist vs. … decelerationism? Capital accumulation vs. capital redistribution?) and the question of decentralization of decision-making process (is that the managerialism vs. multistakeholderism divide?) whose logic is unclear to me. I want to know which affinities are necessary and which are merely contingent.

Follow the money back to the media

I once cared passionately about the impact of money in politics. I’ve blogged about it here a lot. Long ago I campaigned for fair elections. I went to work at a place where I thought I could work on tools to promote government transparency and electoral reform. This presidential election, I got excited about Rootstrikers. I vocally supported Buddy Roemer. Of course, the impact of any of these groups is totally marginal, and my impact within them even more so. Over the summer, I volunteered at a Super PAC, partly to see if there was any way the system could be improved from the inside. I found nothing.

I give up. I don’t believe there’s a way to change the system. I’m going to stop complaining about it and just accept the fact that democracy is a means of balancing different streams of money and power, full stop.

There is silver lining to the cloud. The tools for tracking where campaign donations are coming from are getting better and better. MapLight, for example, seems to do great work. So now we can know which interests are represented in politics. We can sympathize with some and condemn others. We can cheer for our team. Great.

But something that’s often omitted in analysis of money in politics is: where does it go?

So far the most thorough report I’ve been able to find on this (read: first viable google hit) was this PBS News Hour. It breaks it down pretty much as you would expect. The money goes to:

  • Television ads. Since airtime is limited, this means that political ads were being aired very early on.
  • Political consultants who specialize in election tactics.
  • Paid canvassers, knocking door-to-door or making phone calls to engage voters.

Interesting that so much of the money flows to media outlets, who presumably raise prices for advertising when candidates are competing for it with deep pockets. So… the mainstream media benefits hugely from boundless campaign spending.

Come to think of it, it must be that the media benefits much more than politicians or donors from the current financing system. Why is that? A campaign is a zero-sum game. Financially backing a candidate is taking a risk on their loss, and in a tight race one is likely to face fierce competition from other donors. But the outlets that candidates compete over for airtime and the consultants who have “mastered” the political system get to absorb all that funding without needing any particular stake in the outcome of the election. (Once in office, can a politician afford to upset the media?)

Who else benefits from campaign spending? Maybe the telecom industry, since all the political messaging has to run over it.

Maybe this analysis has something to do with why generating political momentum around campaign finance reform is a grueling uphill battle. Because the more centralized and powerful a media outlet, the more it has to gain from expensive campaign battling. It can play gatekeeper and sell passage to the highest bidder.

Taking it one step farther: since the media, through its selection of news items, can heavily influence voters’ perception of candidates, it is in their power to calibrate their news in a way that necessitates further spending by candidates.

Suppose a candidate is popular enough to win an election by a landslide. It would be in the interests of media outlets to start portraying that candidate badly, highlighting their gaffes or declaring them to be weak or whatever else, to force the candidate to spend money on advertising to reshape the public perception of them.

What a racket.

averting the techno-apocalypse

I was worried when I wrote this that I was exaggerating the phenomenon of literati denouncing technical progress. Then I happened upon this post by a pseudonymous Mr. Teacup, which echoes themes from Morozov’s review.

(At a company Christmas party, we exchanged Secret Santa gifts drawn from each other’s Amazon wish lists. I received Žižek’s In Defense of Lost Causes, and was asked by the Ivy-League educated hacker founder what the book was about. I explained that the book’s lost cause was Enlightenment values, and he was totally shocked by this because he had never heard that they were even in doubt – a typical example of hackers’ ignorance of intellectual trends outside their narrow fields of engineering expertise. But this naivety may explain why some parts of the public finds Silicon Valley’s pseudo-revolutionary marketing message so compelling – their hostility to the humanities has, for good or ill, spared them the influence of postmodernity, so that they are the only segment of society that unselfconsciously adopts universal-emancipatory rhetoric. Admittedly, this rhetoric is misleading and conceals a primarily capitalist agenda. Nonetheless, the public’s misrecognition of Silicon Valley’s potential to liberate also contains a moment of truth.)

All of this is true. But it’s also a matter of perspective. The “narrow fields of engineering expertise” require, to some extent, an embrace of Enlightenment values and universal-emancipatory rhetoric. Meanwhile, the humanities, which have adopted a kind of universal-problematic rhetoric (in which intellectual victory is achieved by labeling something as ‘problematic’), are themselves insulated. Can it be truthfully said that such rhetoric is an ‘intellectual trend’ outside of the narrow fields of high brow wordslinging?

I wouldn’t know, as I’ve been exposed enough to both sides to have gotten both bugs. And, I’d guess, so has Mr. Teacup, who writes in what I believe is an hyperintellectualized parody:

The reader will find in these pages a repository of chronologically-arranged personal writings on topics at turns varied and repetitious, circulating around certain themes: the Internet and the problematics of New Media; Capitalism; Anti-Capitalism; Psychoanalysis; Film; the works of Žižek, Lacan and others; etc.

…while the author is in fact a web professional living in this century.

I think Mr. Teacup does a good job of diagnosing some of the roots of technophobia. The technophobe denies that the technologists are in fact transforming society because they believe change is possible and are terrified that it will occur, while the technologist is happy to say that Things are Changing–but just as they Always Have, though perhaps much more significantly in their era. (Isn’t the rate of technological change “increasing”? Isn’t that a natural consequence of Moore’s law?)

Those who domesticate social change are telling us that nothing is going to happen: “Yes, things will change, but don’t worry about it! Society will adjust and everything will go back to normal.” This is true conservatism. But some are afraid, because they believe change can really happen. (For example, the Tea Party is the only political group that believes in socialism, while progressives continually deny that it is a possibility.)

What if the converse is also true: those who believe in change are afraid, and this is not the same as opposing it. The technophobic nightmare scenarios of machines spinning out of control is not a delusional fantasy. On the contrary, it gives us an extremely accurate psychological representation of what genuine social change entails. The radical step is to simply endorse it. From the standpoint of the old ways, the birth of the New must be subjectively experienced as an apocalyptic event.

So, Morozov‘s loathing of the Hybrid Reality Institute is due to what again? A legitimate fear that technological change will usher in an autocratic regime that is run by technocratic industrialists without democratic consent. Mr. Teacup writes:

This reveals the general problem with deconstructing the human-technology binary: it frequently undermines legitimate grievances about the coercive uses of technology. People are not that stupid, they don’t oppose technology because they don’t realize they are always-already technologically mediated. They oppose technology because they do realize it – this is what makes it a crucial site of political resistance.

The problem, though, is that technophobia, however entertainingly it is articulated, will do nothing to stop technical change, because (as it’s already been conceded) the people responsible for technical change don’t bother reading expansive critiques informed by the intellectual trends in the humanities. Rather, it seems that technologists are developing their own intellectual tradition based on theories of the Singularity and individual rationality. A more mathematized, libertarian, and pragmatic great-grandchild of Enlightenment thought.

The question for those concerned with the death of democratic politics or the rise of technocolonialism, then, has got to be: how do you do better than whining? Given that technological change is going to happen, how can it be better steered towards less “problematic” ends?

The difficulty with this question is that it is deeply sociotechnical. Meaning, it’s a question where social and technical problems are interleaved so densely that it requires expertise from both sides of the aisle. Which means that the literati and digerati are going to have to respectfully talk to each other.