reflexive control

by Sebastian Benthall

A theory I wish I had more time to study in depth these days is the Soviet field of reflexive control (see for example this paper by Timothy Thomas on the subject).

Reflexive control is defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action. Even though the theory was developed long ago in Russia, it is still undergoing further refinement. Recent proof of this is the development in February 2001, of a new Russian journal known as Reflexive Processes and Control. The journal is not simply the product of a group of scientists but, as the editorial council suggests, the product of some of Russia’s leading national security institutes, and boasts a few foreign members as well.

While the paper describes the theory in broad strokes, I’m interested in how one would formalize and operationalize reflexive control. My intuitions thus far are like this: traditional control theory assumes that the controlled system is inanimate or at least not autonomous. The controlled system is steered, often dynamically, to some optimal state. But in reflexive control, the assumption is that the controlled system is autonomous and has a decision-making process or intelligence. Therefore reflexive control is a theory of influence, perhaps deception. Going beyond mere propaganda, it seems like reflexive control can be highly reactive, taking into account the reaction time of other agents in the field.

There are many examples, from a Russian perspective, of the use of reflexive control theory during conflicts. One of the most recent and memorable was the bombing of the market square in Sarejevo in 1995. Within minutes of the bombing, CNN and other news outlets were reporting that a Serbian mortar attack had killed many innocent people in the square. Later, crater analysis of the shells that impacted in the square, along with other supporting evidence, indicated that the incident did not happen as originally reported. This evidence also threw into doubt the identities of the perpetrators of the attack. One individual close to the investigation, Russian Colonel Andrei Demurenko, Chief of Staff of Sector Sarejevo at the time, stated, “I am not saying the Serbs didn’t commit this atrocity. I am saying that it didn’t happen the way it was originally reported.” A US and Canadian officer soon backed this position. Demurenko believed that the incident was an excellent example of reflexive control, in that the incident was made to look like it had happened in a certain way to confuse decision-makers.

Thomas’s article points out that the notable expert in reflexive control in the United States is V. A. Lefebvre, a Soviet ex-pat and mathematical psychologist at UC Irvine. He is listed on a faculty listing but doesn’t seem to have a personal home page. His wikipedia page says that reflexive theory is like the Soviet alternative to game theory. That makes sense. Reflexive theory has been used by Lefebvre to articulate a mathematical ethics, which is surely relevant to questions of machine ethics today.

Beyond its fascinating relevance to many open research questions in my field, it is interesting to see in Thomas’s article how “reflexive control” seems to capture so much of what is considered “cybersecurity” today.

One of the most complex ways to influence a state’s information resources is by use of reflexive control measures against the state’s decision-making processes. This aim is best accomplished by formulating certain information or disinformation designed to affect a specific information resource best. In this context an information resource is defined as:

  • information and transmitters of information, to include the method or technology of obtaining, conveying, gathering, accumulating, processing, storing, and exploiting that information;
  • infrastructure, including information centers, means for automating information processes, switchboard communications, and data
    transfer networks;
  • programming and mathematical means for managing information;
  • administrative and organizational bodies that manage information processes, scientific personnel, creators of data bases and knowledge, as well as personnel who service the means of informatizatsiya [informatization].

Unlike many people, I don’t think “cybersecurity” is very hard to define at all. The prefix “cyber-” clearly refers to the information-based control structures of a system, and “security” is just the assurance of something against threats. So we might consider “reflexive control” to be essentially equivalent to “cybersecurity”, except with an emphasis on the offensive rather than defensive aspects of cybernetic control.

I have yet to find something describing the mathematical specifics of the theory. I’d love to find something and see how it compares to other research in similar fields. It would be fascinating to see where Soviet and Anglophone research on these topics is convergent, and where it diverges.