artificial life, artificial intelligence, artificial society, artificial morality

by Sebastian Benthall

“Everyone” “knows” what artificial intelligence is and isn’t and why it is and isn’t a transformative thing happening in society and technology and industry right now.

But the fact is that most of what “we” “call” artificial intelligence is really just increasingly sophisticated ways of solving a single class of problems: optimization.

Essentially what’s happened in AI is that all empirical inference problems can be modeled as Bayesian problems, which are then solved using variational inference methods, which are essentially just turning the Bayesian statistic problem into a solvable form of an optimization problem, and solving it.

Advances in optimization have greatly expanded the number of things computers can accomplish as part of a weak AI research agenda.

Frequently these remarkable successes in Weak AI are confused with an impending revolution in what used to be called Strong AI but which now is more frequently called Artificial General Intelligence, or AGI.

Recent interest in AGI has spurred a lot of interesting research. How could it not be interesting? It is also, for me, extraordinarily frustrating research because I find the philosophical precommitments of most AGI researchers baffling.

One insight that I wish made its way more frequently into discussions of AGI is an insight made by the late Francisco Varela, who argued that you can’t really solve the problem of artificial intelligence until you have solved the problem of artificial life. This is for the simple reason that only living things are really intelligent in anything but the weak sense of being capable of optimization.

Once being alive is taken as a precondition for being intelligent, the problem of understanding AGI implicates a profound and fascinating problem of understanding the mathematical foundations of life. This is a really amazing research problem that for some reason is never ever discussed by anybody.

Let’s assume it’s possible to solve this problem in a satisfactory way. That’s a big If!

Then a theory of artificial general intelligence should be able to show how some artificial living organisms are and others are not intelligent. I suppose what’s most significant here is the shift in thinking of AI in terms of “agents”, a term so generic as to be perhaps at the end of the day meaningless, to thinking of AI in terms of “organisms”, which suggests a much richer set of preconditions.

I have similar grief over contemporary discussion of machine ethics. This is a field with fascinating, profound potential. But much of what machine ethics boils down to today are trolley problems, which are as insipid as they are troublingly intractable. There’s other, better machine ethics research out there, but I’ve yet to see something that really speaks to properly defining the problem, let alone solving it.

This is perhaps because for a machine to truly be ethical, as opposed to just being designed and deployed ethically, it must have moral agency. I don’t mean this in some bogus early Latourian sense of “wouldn’t it be fun if we pretended seatbelts were little gnomes clinging to our seats” but in an actual sense of participating in moral life. There’s a good case to be made that the latter is not something easily reducible to decontextualized action or function, but rather has to do with how own participates more broadly in social life.

I suppose this is a rather substantive metaethical claim to be making. It may be one that’s at odds with common ideological trainings in Anglophone countries where it’s relatively popular to discuss AGI as a research problem. It has more in common, intellectually and philosophically, with continental philosophy than analytic philosophy, whereas “artificial intelligence” research is in many ways a product of the latter. This perhaps explains why these two fields are today rather disjoint.

Nevertheless, I’d happily make the case that the continental tradition has developed a richer and more interesting ethical tradition than what analytic philosophy has given us. Among other reasons this is because of how it is able to situated ethics as a function of a more broadly understood social and political life.

I postulate that what is characteristic of social and political life is that it involves the interaction of many intelligent organisms. Which of course means that to truly understand this form of life and how one might recreate it artificially, one must understand artificial intelligence and, transitively, artificial life.

Only one artificial society is sufficiently well-understood could we then approach the problem of artificial morality, or how to create machines that truly act according to moral or ethical ideals.